The Problems of Philosophy (Russell): Existence and Nature of Matter

"No; we have been as usual asking the wrong question. It does not matter a hoot what the mockingbird on the chimney is singing. The real and proper question is: Why is it beautiful?" - Bertrand Russell

Philosophy has been thoroughly obsessed with matter ever since its inception. It was Thales who thought matter is water, the first principle of all things. Anaximander thought it could not be any natural element, and thus called his matter apeiron; an indefinite substance from which everything is born. For Anaximenes it was air, for Pythagoras numbers, for Plato particulars, and so on. Even today, philosophically, "matter" is used to distinguish material objects of the universe from the spiritual. For Russell, philosophy has been far too occupied with repeated attempts to answer the same questions. He aims to clarify the most basic problems of philosophy, like the debates on existence and nature of matter. 

 In Chapter 1, Russell asked two questions: Is there any such thing as matter? If so, what is its nature? These, he undertakes in Chapter 2 and 3 of his book, The Problems of Philosophy.

Russell's first question is: Is there such a thing as matter (existing independently of my mind)?

With reference to Descartes, Russell points out that we can be certain of the sense data we receive. The question is then, can sense data be considered as signs of the existence of physical objects which exist independently of the mind? 

Russell looks into two arguments regarding existence of matter. 

1) Argument from public accessibility of objects:

We see that different people all have similar experiences of objects. If this is so, then there must be something independent of my mind which grounds the commonality or uniformity in the experiences of different subjects. Not just myself, but everyone else also sees the table. So, the table must exist independently of me perceiving it. 

The problem with this argument is that I know of other subjects, other minds, on the basis of their physical bodies like mine, which behave in ways indicative of a mind. But, if I cannot be certain about the existence of other bodies, then I cannot even know other subjects, nor their experiences of objects. Then there's no scope of arguing for the existence of physical objects on the basis of commonality in these experiences, when I cannot even be certain of the existence of the body who is the bearer of these experiences. This is borderline solipsism. 

Here, Russell admits that we can never know an external reality without any possibility of doubt since there is no contradiction in assuming that all there is are creations of my own mind. Nonetheless, we can make an argument that gives us reasonable confidence that external reality exists. This leads to the second argument. 

2) Argument from simplicity:

There are two competing hypotheses provided:

a) there is no external reality, no matter existing independently of my mind (like the empiricism of Berkeley; esse est percipi)

b) there really is matter existing independently of my mind; there are physical objects with at least some properties corresponding to the aspects captured in my sense data

There are patterns and uniformities in one's experience. To say that it is just our sense data leaves a mysterious gap in understanding how there are such patterns and uniformities in sense data. Why aren't sense data completely random?

These hypotheses must account for such patterns and uniformities. 

For example, to know that " my pet cat gets hungry." If there is only sense data, the notion of hunger would be difficult to account for. 

Another example is that of growth. The same seed becomes a tree. If one believes that there is only sense data, persistence of objects would be hard to understand. 

Similarly, some patches of colour show the tendency to move towards the "sky" (flying birds), whereas other patches of colour (cats) never do. Why doesn't the cat constituting sense data not "fly into the sky" but only bird constituting sense data do? The idea is that there are certain physical objects which have certain properties and tendencies, and this offers a simple and satisfying explanation of the persistence of objects, patterns and uniformity which we observe in our sense data. This is also an application of Ockham's Razor, that the simpler explanation is more likely to be correct. 

Despite these two arguments, Russell points out that we do not come to believe in physical objects on the basis of these explanations. No one thinks to themselves that the existence of this table should be believed because everyone else is also believing, and that it is the most plausible explanation that the table actually exists. These two arguments (public accessibility and simplicity) can justify our belief in the table, but they are not the means by which these beliefs originate. Such beliefs are formed instinctively.

For Russell, only beliefs can be reasons to reject beliefs. If there are times where our instinctive beliefs are wrong, this is so only because they conflict with other instinctive beliefs. Beliefs tend to form a system where they support each other giving us a coherent web or system of beliefs. Russell proposes that as long as the system of instinctive beliefs is coherent/harmonious, the whole system may be considered worthy of acceptance. 

There is always a possibility of error, but by organizing our instinctive beliefs, and in case of conflicts preserving those which are most possible, the likelihood of error can be greatly diminished. He takes the task of philosophy to be an ordering/organizing of beliefs in this manner. 

Nature of Matter

With the argument from simplicity, Russell thinks that we can be reasonably certain that there is such a thing as matter. Matter being defined as a totality of physical objects existing outside and independently of one's mind. 

However, now the question is what exactly is the nature of such matter? Even idealists like Berkeley would agree that matter in the sense of independence from one's mind does exist. But to Berkeley, such matter is yet not non-mental but composed of ideas in the mind of God. 

What can someone who does not bring in the faith in God but stays philosophically unassuming say about the nature of matter, on the basis of our own sense data about which we can be absolutely certain (and the existence of matter about which we can be reasonably certain)?

Here science can be helpful since it presumably best informs our beliefs about the kind of properties that constitute independent nature of matter. Such properties seem to be spatial (extension), temporal (duration), and light, colour, heat, etc. 

Space

According to Russell, we must differentiate between space as we perceive it through the different senses and space as it exists (or as we take it to exist) independently of us about which science informs us. He thinks that while for science, matter must be in space, that cannot be space as we perceive it. There are two reasons for the difference between real space and apparent space:

1. Space of touch is different from space of sight. The space of touch at any moment extends only as far as we can touch. The space of sight can extend way farther than that. The space of sight occupied by a bottle, for example, depends upon from how far or close it is looked at. If touch can reveal the space occupied by a bottle at all, it always remains constant. So apparent space depends on the sensory modality, but real space as revealed by science is independent of that. It cannot be equated with apparent space. 

2. Shapes in space look different from different points and to different people. Apparent space then, is subjective and private, unlike real space. 

Time

Time is explained on similar lines. For example, temporal duration is presumably not subjective but its perception certainly is. An hour seems to fly away when having fun, or when one is fast asleep, but it seems to last forever if stuck in a boring lecture. 

Light, Colour, Heat, etc

None of these (light, colour, heat) are objective properties of the objects in themselves, and thus not constitutive of the real nature of matter, even know we generally think that matter possesses such characteristics (of light, colour, heat, etc). 

Light is understood by science to be a matter of wave motion, but we do not see wave motion. Same goes for sound. Colour changes depending upon lighting, medium through which light is passing, even motion of the object in space. For example, the concept of red shift is observed in distant stars and galaxies, when the wavelength of the light is stretched, and light is seen as "shifted" towards the red part of the spectrum.

With respect to heat and cold, when one is very cold, cold water may also seem warm. So, even heat and cold are not properties of matter.

Now, naturally, the question is what can we know of the nature of matter?

"Assuming that there is physical space, and that is does correspond to private spaces, what can we know about it? We can know only what is required in order to secure the correspondence."- Problems of Philosophy, Ch 3. 

This talks about space specifically, but the point is applied generally. Russell thinks that given we are already reasonably certain that there is matter (which causes sensations and sense data), we can be reasonably certain that the differences, order, relations between sense data that appear to us must correspond to differences, order, relations between objects. 

All our spatial perceptions (irrespective of perspective, location, modalities, and even who is looking) seems to be consistent about the spatial locations of sense data relative to each other. A person observing someone asleep may have a quite distinct perception of temporal duration than that of the person asleep, but nonetheless, both would agree on the order of events. He gives the example of a row of houses. No matter what angle you look at them from, what is certain is their order. 

Even if physical objects do not have the properties we take them to have intrinsically, they must have some relations, order, arrangements among themselves that correspond to relation, order, arrangements amongst our sense data. The same goes for light, colour, heat, etc. 

So, to answer the two questions regarding the existence and nature of matter, Russell himself sums it up as the following:

"What is matter? Never mind."